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RECENT DECISIONS

BILLS AND NoTEs - PRICE v. NEAL - Dun OF PRESENTER BANK TO
MAKE INQUIRY - A stranger opened an account in the defendant bank and
deposited therein several large checks (payable to himself) forged with the
signature of the president of the plaintiff bank and drawn on the plaintiff. The
checks were indorsed by the forger, and also by the defendant, the latter "guaranteeing prior indorsements." After payment by the plaintiff, the amounts were
credited to the forger's account and soon thereafter withdrawn. The plaintiff
alleged a local banking custom which required careful watching of new accounts
and which the defendant failed to observe. On demurrer to the plaintiff's
petition, held, that the rule of Price 'll. Neal 1 is in force under the Negotiable
Instruments Law and that the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient acts of
carelessness on the part of the defendant to prevent the operation of the rule.
Commerce-Guardian Bank 'lJ. Toledo Trust Co., 60 Ohio App. 337, 21 N. E.
(2d) 173 (1938).
The American courts have almost universally adhered to the rule, first
stated by Lord Mansfield in Price 'lJ. Neal, that a paying drawee cannot recover
from the presenter of a forged bill.2 In a leading article on the subject, to which
this note is an addendum, the boundaries of this familiar doctrine were marked
out.8 For the present purpose it will suffice merely to refer briefly to a few of
the conclusions there reached: first, that the more reasonable explanation of
Price 'll. Neal is business expediency; second, that it is the more generally accepted view that section 62 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, which
deals with the liability of an acceptor but makes no express provision with respect
to a paying drawee, was meant to include payment as well as acceptance; and
third, that complicity in the fraud or negligence on the part of the presenter
which contributes to the success of the forger "should overbalance any argument
in the interest of business expediency" and consequently deny the presenter protectioµ of the rule. In the principal case the question was raised: At what point
between mere indorsement of a forged check for payment (in the exercise of
reasonable care), on the one hand, and actual complicity in the fraud, on the
other hand, should the line be drawn beyond which recovery by the drawee
will be allowed? The first assumption made by the court, that an indorsement

3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
§ So (1913).
8 Aigler, "The Doctrine of Price v. Neal," 24 M1cH. L. REv. 809 (1926).
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"for collection" could not in any sense be an inducement to the drawee to relax
its vigilance is not to be denied. 4- More dubious would seem to be the notion
that an indorsement guaranteeing prior indorsements has a comparable legal
effect. In the case at hand, especially, where the only prior indorsement on the
check was that of the forger-payee, would such a rule require very cautious
application. A second proposition, and one on which the decision largely rests,
is that "under the authorities such failure to make inquiry must have induced
or caused the drawee bank to be thr~wn off its guard or misled or to have
relaxed its vigilance." 5 If such were the rule, then it would seem a necessary
result that one who has purchased a check with suspicion of the forgery should
be allowed the defense of Price v. Neal so long as his failure to make inquiry
did not induce the drawee to relax its vigilance. The section that the court
quotes from Corpus Juris Secundum would seem to oppose such a narrow
doctrine and include those cases where by reasonable inquiry of its depositor
the presenter bank might itself have been able to uncover the forgery and thereby
prevent the drawee's mistake. 6 One more point in the opinion merits discussion.
It is said, in effect: recovery of money paid by mistake is allowed on the theory
of unjust enrichment, and, since the money paid is now in the hands of the
forger, the defendant cannot be said to have been enriched thereby. It seems
plain that the court could not have meant to limit a drawee's recovery to cases
where the defendant has made a "profit" on the transaction, for in such case
the courts allow recovery even where the defendant has exercised the highdegree of care.7 As a makeweight, however, it would seem proper to consider
the fact that the defendant has made no profit on the deal. By the authorities,
the cases which have allowed recovery on failure of the presenter to make reasonable inquiry of a stranger are generally classified as an equitable exception to
the rule of Price v. Neal. 8 It is submitted that definitive rules of conduct should
be formulated with the greatest care lest decisions "on the equities" be given an
unintended significance and hamper the free application of this highly salutary
doctrine.
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4 First Nat. Bank of Belmont v. First Nat. Bank of Barnesville, 58 Ohio St. 207,
50 N. E. 723 (1898); Security Commercial & Savings Bank v. Southern Trust &
Commerce Bank, 74 Cal. App. 734, 241 P. 945 (1926), noted 24 MicH. L. REv.
607 (1926).
5 Principal case, 60 Ohio App. at 347.
6 9 C. J. S. 759 (1938). The sentence pertinent to the present discussion follows:
"This rule [Price v. Neal], however, does not prohibit the bank from recovering from
forgers, thieves or those who have no title to the instrument, or from a holder who by
his negligence or jt1Ult has proximatel-y contributed to the success of thff. fraud, or has.
misled the bank, or from one who is not a holder for value or who will be in no
way prejudiced by being compelled to make repayment to the bank." (Italics added.)
See Farmers' Nat. Bank of Augusta v. Farmers' & Traders' Bank of Maysville, 159
Ky. 141,166 S. W. 986 (1914), where a host of cases are critically discussed.
7 American Surety Co. of New York v. Industrial Savings Bank, 242 Mich. 581,
219 N. W. 689 (1928), noted 27 MicH. L. REv. 100 (1928). But see comment by
Professor Aigler, 28 MICH. L. REv. 743 (1930), in which the reasoning of this and
similar decisions along a "holder in due course" analogy is questioned.
8 Aigler, "The Doctrine of Price v. Neal," 24 MicH. L. REv. 809 at 820
(1926); BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw, 6th ed., by Beutel, 769 et seq.
(1938).

